INTRODUCTION

II.
ANALYTICAL managers and investors respecting the nature of fiduciary duties, making it likely that parties will misperceive and misprice their fiduciary duties."
The recently promulgated Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (hereinafter RULLCA) offered the NCCUSL the opportunity to begin to correct its past mistakes regarding the fiduciary duties applicable to managers of unincorporated business entities. 1 2 Unfortunately, the Commissioners squandered this opportunity and, once again in RULLCA, enacted duties that are poorly designed and bound to lead to inefficient and unfair outcomes.
RULLCA contains many of the same misdirected fiduciary duty notions that plague its predecessor uniform acts, although the Commissioners in RULLCA did make a sensible adjustment to managers' duty of loyalty standards 3 and, at least arguably, to managers' duty of oversight or monitoring, a part of their overall duty of care. Any modest progress in these regards, however, was more than offset by the adoption of the "business judgment rule" as a part of an awkward statutory framework for RULLCA's duty of care provision. This overlaying of the "business judgment rule" on RULLCA's negligence standard of care will be confusing to LLC parties and to courts, which in turn will increase transaction costs and the probability of unexpected and unintended outcomes. Even more importantly, the adoption of a business judgment standard will reduce managers' standard of care to a level that is even more lax and inefficient than the present gross negligence standard that one finds in RUPA, ULPA (2001) , and ULLCA. This situation will be made substantially worse if-as seems highly likelycourts defining the application and meaning of RULLCA's business judgment standard turn for guidance to the common law that has developed in Delaware regarding corporate fiduciary duties. Delaware jurisprudence on the matter of corporate fiduciary duties generally 4 and the duty of care specifically is not only 11. The problems in the opt out provisions of RUPA, ULPA (2001) , and ULLCA are due to the statutes' failure to encourage full information among the parties and to the statutory mandatory floor on fiduciary duties, which is set too low. These same problems are found in RULLCA's opt-out provisions as well. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 12. Revised Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act (2006) , 6A U.L.A. 213-94 (Supp. 2007) [hereinafter RULLCA] . See infra Appendices A and B for RULLCA's fiduciary duty and opt-out provisions.
13. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
14. An example of the confusion wrought by Delaware courts can be found in the chaotic state of fiduciary duties applied to managers of corporations that are in financial distress. Delaware courts apparently shifted the beneficiaries ofcorporate managers' fiduciary duties from the corporate shareholders, who are beneficiaries of fiduciary duties during normal, solvent periods, to the corporation, when the corporation is in the "vicinity" of insolvency, and then to creditors, when the corporation becomes insolvent. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers ' Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L. 491,495-506 (2007) (describing shifting fiduciary duties as corporations move from solvency to the vicinity of insolvency to actual insolvency). Obviously, this is extremely confusing for corporate fiduciaries to implement. More importantly, it becomes nearly impossible for corporate constituencies-shareholders, creditors, and managers, for example-to price the terms of their arrangements. The Delaware Supreme Court recently tried to resolve some of this confusion, stating:
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.
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exceedingly confusing" and unnecessarily complex 6 but also overly lax, unduly promanagement and inefficient. 7 In such an environment, managers of LLCs operating under the RULLCA may enjoy default rules that essentially free them from any duty of care and opt out privileges that will further enable them to extract an even more inefficient and unfair "bargain" with those investing in their LLC.' 5 This is a matter of some economic importance. History suggests that the fiduciary duty provisions of RULLCA will define the terms of relationships between many thousands of investors and their agents. It seems certain that a material portion of the small businesses in this country will in time operate as limited liability companies under the provisions of RULLCA. While the first version of the Uniform Liability Company Act has had some difficulty in getting traction, 9 a broader look at the NCCUSL's various uniform unincorporated business statutes demonstrates the popularity these statutes have enjoyed with state legislatures.
2 " Data also demonstrate the increasing importance and popularity of limited liability companies, 2 ' especially N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) . Even that language, of course, does not resolve the uncertainty regarding the beneficiaries of corporate fiduciaries' duties. For example, it is still unclear the extent to which, if any, directors may take an action that benefits non-shareholder constituencies-creditors, for example-at the expense of shareholders. 15. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 16. See supra note 14. An example of the unnecessary complexity of the Delaware common law regarding fiduciary duties is the way Delaware handles a case in which the fiduciary fails to meet one of the predicates of business judgment standard. The most common predicate that is violated is the obligation to make a reasonable investigation, which was the case, for example, in both Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) [hereinafter Technicolor I1] . In Technicolor II, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that when making a business judgment, if the board fails to make a reasonable investigation, then the case must be considered (or more likely-as was the case in Technicolor //-reconsidered) under an intrinsic fairness standard. Id. at 370 (failure to use reasonable care at the investigation stage "required the directors to prove that the transaction was entirely fair"). One is at a loss regarding the logic of such an approach. The duty to make a reasonable investigation is a duty owed, and if the failure to meet that duty causes harm, the violator of the duty should be liable in damages to the injured party. In short, once the duty is violated, the better approach is to consider the case at that point only a matter of causation and damages. Certainly, one should not go back and re-litigate the standard, as is done in Delaware.
17 567-68 (2007) , the author offers a history of state adoptions of limited liability company acts and speculates about the low adoption rate of ULLCA. The author notes that at the time ULLCA was promulgated, "most states had just completed... adopting their own... statutes, and few states wanted to quickly return to their legislative chambers to adopt a different LLC statute." Id. at 568.
20. See supra note 2 for adoptions of RUPA, ULPA (2001), and ULLCA. In addition to those acts, prior uniform acts governing partnerships and limited partnerships were widely adopted. For example, the NCCUSL website reports that the Uniform Partnership Act, which was the predecessor to RUPA, "was adopted in every state except Louisiana." NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org (follow "Final Acts & Legislation" hyperlink; then follow "Partnership Act" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 11, 2008 
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Finally, it is difficult to overstate the importance of small businesses to our economy. There are, for example, approximately 5.2 million businesses in the United States with less than twenty employees. 22 Those small businesses employ a total of 20.8 million workers, or approximately 18.4% of all workers in the United States economy. 23 The products of small businesses are vital to our everyday life, 24 and the firms themselves are an important source of entrepreneurial energy and initiatives.
25
It is unfortunate, therefore, that NCCUSL's most recent iteration of fiduciary duty provisions in RULLCA will once again facilitate outcomes that are unfair, inefficient and not priced by LLC parties.
States, of course, do not face an all-or-nothing requirement regarding the adoption of RULLCA. They are, instead, able to adopt all, most, some or none of the Act. 26 This, then, becomes the prescriptive center ofimy piece. States adopting RULLCA should reject RULLCA's flawed fiduciary duty provisions. States should re-make the fiduciary duty provisions, including the opt-out provisions, in a way that facilitates fair and efficient outcomes. This, in turn, requires states to adopt duty of care and duty of loyalty provisions that fully-informed parties-the LLC owners and their agents or managers-would agree upon in most cases. States should also adjust RULLCA's optout provisions in a way that promotes full information at the time the parties "agree" to re-make the statutory fiduciary duties.
In Part II of this article, I offer an analytical and critical framework within which to evaluate RULLCA's fiduciary duty provisions. The framework is based on simple, uncontroversial principles, which, unfortunately, seem to have been overlooked by the Committee that considered and promulgated RULLCA. In Part III, I use this framework to demonstrate the significant flaws in RULLCA's fiduciary dutyprovisions and to support the prescription that is suggested. The nature and scope of the fiduciary duties running between the owners of a LLC and their agents are fundamentally private matters, and the terms of their arrangements generate no apparent material externalities. 27 Assuming that both parties-the owners of the LLC and their agents-are fully informed and that there are no other impediments to their bargaining with each other, it is difficult to identify any adverse material economic impact caused, for example, by the level of care that the agents are obliged to observe in acting on behalf of the LLC owners."
Economic and moral theories support the rights of parties in such circumstances to construct the terms of their private arrangements. In economic theory, allowing parties freely to bargain and trade is essential to the creation of economic value and wealth. 29 In moral theory, permitting or encouraging such trades enhances utility and autonomy, values that underlie, respectively, utilitarianism 30 439, 443 (1997) ). Non-owner constituencies--creditors, for example-may argue that they suffer a negative externality if investors and managers agree to a very low standard of care, because the low standard of managerial care may subject creditors to increased default risk. Creditors, however, are able to secure full compensation for any such increased risk by increasing the price they charge for their credit or, alternatively, contracting for their own, higher, standard of care.
29. Economists often speak of"economic efficiency" or "wealth maximization," which maybe defined as a state in which property or rights are in the hands of those that are willing and able to pay the most for the property or rights. See, e.g., the discussion in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-16 (6th ed. 2003) . Judge Posner has offered a moral defense of the pursuit of economic efficiency as leading to "an ethically attractive combination of happiness, of rights (to liberty and property), and of sharing with less fortunate members of society. 
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This may suggest no need for societal rules respecting fiduciary duties of LLC agents or managers, as parties in each case should bargain for particularized fiduciary duties that suit their preference. Such is not the case, however. Well-crafted, societal fiduciary duty provisions can promote efficiency and fair outcomes in a number of ways.
Economists have long recognized that default fiduciary duty rules can promote efficiency by lowering transaction costs. 32 Majoritarian default rules-the rules that most LLC owners and their agents would select in most cases---can promote efficiency by saving most parties the necessity and thus the expense of negotiating, constructing, and memorializing the terms of their particular arrangement. The default rules simply become off-the-shelf contracts that the parties adopt without any action on their parts. Some parties-those whose preferences are not captured by the majoritarian default rules-will have the costs of re-making or opting out of the default rules, but significant efficiencies may be generated by reducing transactional cost in most cases.
33
Majoritarian fiduciary rules do not lead to an efficient outcome in every case, however.
34 Both economic theory and empirical research" suggest that default rules tend to be "sticky." The term "stickiness" is used to describe default rules that parties do not remake or opt out of, even when the default rules do not suit their preferences.
Stickiness often may be explained by reference to the transaction costs associated with opting out, since rational parties will not opt out of a default rule if the value created by opting out is less than the costs of opting out. To use a simple example, if the value created by opting out of default provisions is ten, but it costs the parties twenty to opt out, the parties will not exercise their opt-out rights but, instead, will operate under the assumedly inefficient default provision. REv. 828 (1979 1416, 1444-45 (1989) (arguing in favor of corporate law that "fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance"); Daniel R. 34. In addition to the points made here, non-majoritarian default rules may in some cases promote efficiency by enhancing the information available to the bargaining parties. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 10 (examining the extent to which statutory default rules governing takeovers and contests for corporate control are accepted or remade by corporations and their shareholders); Miller, supra note 19, at 586 (reporting that with regard to parties in an LLC bargaining for contractual rights, "The empirical research paints a picture of an imperfect and diverse contractual playing field.").
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This stickiness demonstrates the need for society in most situations to enact majoritarian default rules.
36 Non-majoritarian default rules increase the number of parties that will be required to opt out of the default rule in order to achieve an efficient outcome in their particular case. Stickiness makes matters even worse because parties whose preferences differ from the default rules may be captured by the stickiness and thus fail to achieve efficient arrangements between or among themselves.
For default rules to work at their best, the parties must be fully informed. Full information, of course, is always an important prerequisite for an efficient trade. Without full information on the part of both parties, we cannot be sure that the trade enhances allocative efficiency. When operating under default rules, full information on the part of parties is necessary in order for the parties to make value-maximizing decisions regarding whether to accept the default rule or opt out.
Default rules defining the fiduciary duties of LLC mangers, therefore, should be fashioned in a way that promotes full information on the parts of all parties to the LLC. Society should avoid rules that encourage or enable informationally-privileged LLC parties to exploit their superior position though inefficient "bargains."
In summary, for rules respecting LLC fiduciary duties to work in a pleasing way, the rules generally should be majoritarian default rules and should be designed in a manner that promotes fully informed bargaining. Measured against these simple, widely accepted concepts, one finds that NCCUSL, once again in RULLCA, promulgated fiduciary duty standards that are materially deficient.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER RULLCA
RULLCA's fiduciary duty provisions 37 continue the general construct found in the fiduciary duty provisions of RUPA, RULPA (2001) , and ULLCA by dividing fiduciary duties into a duty of loyalty and a duty of care, and then overlaying a good faith obligation on the regime.
3
" While this overall approach is sound, RULLCA's specific fiduciary duty rules will generate, or at least facilitate, outcomes that are inefficient and unfair. 
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portions of the corporate jurisprudence that have developed in regard to the duty of care. Much of the jurisprudence is found in the common law of Delaware.
Corporate directors' duty of care is divided along functional lines into monitoring responsibilities and decision-making responsibilities. 4 The monitoring function involves the duty of corporate directors to exercise oversight over the affairs of the corporation and, importantly, over the officers and agents who run the corporation. Corporate boards of directors are required to monitor the officers and agents of the corporation to make sure, for example, that they are not expropriating corporate value or otherwise mismanaging the corporation. The propriety of a corporate board's monitoring is generally evaluated under a negligence standard. Therefore, boards are charged in their oversight function to act reasonably. Corporate directors' discrete decisions-as contrasted to their monitoring functions-may be evaluated under the business judgment rule, 43 and in that case their duty of care obligations are more complicated. Under what I shall refer to as the traditional business judgment rule,' directors must meet the predicates for the applicability of the business judgment rule, including good faith and the absence of a conflict. 46 The other predicate for the applicability of the business judgment rule is that the directors must be fully informed when they make their discrete decision or 1981), a case in which a director who was old, infirm, and seemingly unsophisticated was held to have violated her monitoring duty as a result of the theft of corporate assets by her sons, who were the senior officers of the corporation. The court applied a negligence standard to the director's monitoring obligation and concluded that the director had, in that case, acted unreasonably or negligently. The obligation of corporate boards to monitor came under intense scrutiny in the wake of the debacle of Enron and other large companies. It seems unlikely that society, operating in the wake of Enron, is inclined to reduce the rigor of the standard applied to this function.
43. Section 4.0 1(c) of the Principles of Corporate Governance offers a clear articulation of a widely held view of the business judgment rule. The comments to the section also offer a wealth of background, citations, and analyses regarding the business judgment rule. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) cmts.
44. What I refer to as the "traditional business judgment rule" is explicated by section 4.01(c) of the Principles of Corporate Governance. See infra notes 45-47, 50.
45. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (stating that to get the business judgment standard, a corporate manager must make "a business judgment in good faith").
46. See, e.g., id. § 4.01(c)(1) (stating that a corporate manager is entitled to the business judgment standard only if she "is not interested in the subject of the business judgment").
[Vol. 61:1 RULLCA 'S "NEW" FIDUCIARY STANDARDS business judgment. This obligation to be fully informed is measured against a negligence standard and thus requires the directors to inform themselves "with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director . . . reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances [emphasis added]. 47 It is this obligation, of course, that boards in some of the highest profile Delaware cases-such as Smith v. Van Gorkom 48 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 49 -failed to meet. The traditional business judgment rule cuts boards some slack at the point where the board members actually make their decision. If a board in making a discrete decision is unconflicted and acting in good faith and has made a reasonable investigation into the decision, then the propriety of their actual decision is no longer evaluated under a rigorous negligence standard. Instead, the actual judgment of the board is evaluated under a less rigorous standard of care, such as gross negligence.
5 " RULLCA's duty of care provision is apparently intended to follow this corporate model. Accordingly, RULLCA's business judgment carve-out from the general care standard of negligence would seemingly not apply to monitoring responsibilities. As in the traditional corporate model," managers of LLCs operating under RULLCA are bound by a negligence standard with regard to their monitoring or oversight duties, and evaluating the propriety of the monitoring by managers of LLCs under a negligence standard is sound. It is an efficient and fair standard. It also amounts to an improvement over the gross negligence standard that applies to fiduciaries' monitoring function under RUPA, ULPA (2001), and ULLCA.
52
As described earlier, strong arguments favor permitting LLC owners and their agents to construct their own terms regarding the agents' standard of care and generally 47. Id. § 4.0 1(c)(2). Courts have sometimes referred to the three predicates-good faith, the absence of a conflict, and a reasonable inquiry or investigation-as the "triad" of business judgment, although courts may articulate the components of the triad in somewhat different terms. See, e.g., Technicolor II, 634 A.2d irectors failure to make due inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action (as opposed to a deliberative decision not to act), does not qualify for protection under the business judgment rule.").
52. See supra note 6 for the duty of care provisions in these prior uniform acts. The prior uniform acts utilize gross negligence as the applicable standard of care, making no distinction between monitoring and discrete decisions or between investigation and decision-making. Gross negligence is the ubiquitous standard.
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support societal default rules that mimic the arrangement that most of the parties would agree upon in most cases. 53 Applying these simple and seemingly noncontroversial economic principles here, it is difficult to imagine that most LLC investors and LLC fiduciaries would agree to a monitoring standard of care that is less rigorous than negligence. It seems more likely that most fully informed LLC investors in most cases would demand and be willing to pay for a "reasonable" level of monitoring care from their fiduciaries. Rational fiduciaries should be willing to accept this higher standard for additional compensation, and my intuition is that competition in the capital management market would squeeze the additional compensation that managers are able to extract for the higher standard, making the deal attractive for investors.
The gain in RULLCA--compared to prior uniform acts-in adopting a more rigorous negligence standard for monitoring is more than offset, however, by the harm generated by the ill-conceived adoption in RULLCA of the business judgment rule. Overlaying a business judgment rule on RULLCA's general duty of care standard, which is based on negligence, is sure to lead to confusion and unintended, inefficient, and unfair outcomes.
Confusion appeared early in regard to the core components of the business judgment. For example, in Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court confused the key standards of negligence and gross negligence, stating that the Trans Union board "was grossly negligent" because it did not act with "reasonable deliberation." 54 There also have been various articulations of the business judgment standard applicable at decision making. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court set the standard of gross negligence, 55 but different formulations, such as "honestly believes" and "rationally believes," were offered as well. 56 Perhaps, however, the confusion over the meaning of business judgment is most vividly seen by comparing the traditional business judgment rule, which is well articulated in the Principles of Corporate Governance, with Chancellor Allen's articulation of the business judgment rule in In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litigation. As described above, the Principles of Corporate Governance set the standard of care at the investigation stage at negligence 57 [Vol. 61:1
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stage at "rationally believes."
5
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen articulates very different standards under the businessjudgment rule. Consider the following language:
[C]ompliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality ofthe process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational," provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in agood faith effort to advance corporate interests.
59
On its face, this language from Caremark represents a dramatic relaxation of the traditional business judgment standards articulated above. At the investigation stage, Chancellor Allen sets the standard at "good faith," which certainly is well below a reasonableness or negligent standard that is required under the traditional approach to business judgment.
6
" With regard to the standard by which we judge the actual decision itself, Chancellor Allen says that there is none applicable, even in instances where the decision is "stupid," "egregious," or "irrational," as "compliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss.... 6 Again, this amounts to a significant relaxation of the standard of care articulated under the traditional business judgment rule, where a grossly negligent decision may violate the director's duty.
62
State courts, therefore, interpreting the meaning of RULLCA's "subject to the business judgment rule" language can find support for imposing standards at the investigation stage ranging from negligence to "good faith," and standards at the decision-making stage ranging from gross negligence to no standard whatsoever. This means that managers and controlling members ofLLCs operating under RULLCA will have little idea about the standards to which they are held, and members will have little idea about the quality of management they have purchased. As a result, parties forming LLCs are quite likely to misunderstand and misprice a negligence "subject to the business judgment rule" standard, which may lead to unintended, inefficient, and unfair outcomes.
Incorporating the business judgment standard into RULLCA's duty of care also risks infecting the LLC duty of care with other misdirected concepts that courts (principally Delaware courts) have layered on the business judgment analysis. One such concept, for example, that is a part of business judgment but that should be avoided is the notion of what happens when one of the predicates of business judgment is violated. The most common predicate that is violated is the obligation to make a reasonable investigation. 63 Consider for example a situation in which managers of a 
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manager-managed LLC, without any investigation, purchase a very expensive machine that turns out to be worthless. Assume that a reasonable investigation was not made, and if it had been made, the defects in the machine would have been discovered. The Delaware corporate regime would require that the case be considered or, more likely, reconsidered under an intrinsic fairness standard. The most extreme example of this is found in the Technicolor litigation, which bounced back and forth for years between the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court, due in part to the reconsideration and the resulting appeals on this matter. ' One is at a loss regarding the logic of such an approach. The duty to make a reasonable investigation is a duty owed, and if the failure to meet that duty causes harm, the violator of the duty should be liable. In short, once the duty is violated, the better approach is to consider the case at that point only a matter of causation and damages. Certainly it makes no sense to go back and re-litigate the matter under another standard, as is done in Delaware.
65
There is another even more fundamental problem in adopting a business judgment rule as part of RULLCA's duty of care. The business judgment rule amounts to an 64. In Technicolor I, the Supreme Court of Delaware remanded the case to the Chancery Court after concluding that the board had not made a reasonable investigation. 634 A.2d at 345-46. The Chancery Court was ordered to consider the transaction under the intrinsic fairness standard. Id 65. Another misdirected concept attached to the business judgment rule is the practice of considering the business judgment rule as a standard of review instead of a standard of conduct. See EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 401-02 (explaining the relationship between a standard of conduct and a standard of review and offering an explanation for the laxness of the business judgment standard). Professor Eisenberg defines a standard of conduct as "how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role," and he concludes that the applicable standard is negligence or reasonableness. Id. at 401. A standard of review, on the other hand, he explains as "the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief," and that standard he believes is a "rational" standard. Id. at 401-02. As explained by Justice Norman Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court, the standard of conduct establishes the aspirational standard for corporate managers and the standard of review establishes the liability standard. See Corporate Governance Principles Emerge in Environment of "Competitive Federalism", Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Feb. 4, 2004, at 5, available at http://business.cch. con/securitieslaw/news/2-4-04.asp. Thus, we want corporate managers to act reasonably, but we hold them liable only if their conduct is irrational.
Not only is this a very confusing analysis, but also it is unsound as a matter of policy and economics. The only situation in which courts should enforce a standard that is not an "aspirational" standard and, instead, adopt a different, less desirable standard is in a situation in which the incremental costs generated by moving from the inefficient, non-aspirational standard to the efficient, aspirational standard are greater than the incremental benefits from the move. It is difficult, however, to find any significant differences in the enforcement costs between the two standards.
It may be that the real underpinning for the relaxed standard in business judgment is the belief that negligence is not the efficient standard of care, because it is not the standard of care that most parties, corporate managers and investors, would select in most cases, if they were able to bargain with one another. Investors, for example, may prefer a lax standard as a way to encourage risk-taking and reducing the salaries of corporate managers. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BuSINESS ORGANIZATION 243 (2d ed. 2007) ("Liability under a negligence standard therefore would predictably discourage officers and directors form undertaking valuable but risky projects."). If that is the case, negligence is not an aspirational standard, since the parties to the transaction favor a different standard and there are not negative externalities in their choosing any standard that suits them. In short, courts should adopt a clearly articulated efficient standard of care and provide an incentive, i.e., personal liability, for parties to adhere to that efficient standard. Disguising this in confusing procedures and articulations is undesirable.
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inefficient standard of care for managers of LLCs. The inefficiency is exacerbated if the LLC business judgment rule is interpreted consistent with Chancellor Allen's language from Caremark.
Even the gross negligence standard under the traditional business judgment rule seems overly lax and unlikely to provide an incentive for the level of management skill that most-fully informed LLC parties-LLC owners and their managers or controlling members-would agree on in most cases. It seems unlikely that most investors would turn their money over to LLC fiduciaries who told the investors in clear terms, "We do not warrant that we will act reasonably in regard to your best interests." Fully informed of this, I believe that investors would look for other agents to manage their capital and that competition in the capital management market would provide other reasonably priced managers willing to agree at an attractive price to act reasonably in regard to the pursuit of the best interests of the owners.
Quite obviously, it is even more difficult-indeed for me it is impossible-to conclude that Chancellor Allen's version of the business judgment standard is an efficient standard of care. Imagine the manager or controlling member of an LLC who tells potential LLC investors in clear terms: "I solicit your investment in the LLC that I shall manage, but I do not warrant that I will act reasonably in regard to your best interests, and furthermore I am permitted, with total impunity, to manage your investment in a manner that is stupid, egregious, or irrational." My opinion is that investors would look elsewhere in the capital management market for investments.
Some may disagree with my factual reckoning on this matter, although my opinion of the matter is firmly held. Some may argue that, as a matter of the facts, most parties would settle on a gross negligence standard for the duty of care in an LLC or, if one is attracted to the reckoning of Chancellor Allen, no duty of care. Persuasive arguments can be made, however, in favor of resolving any ambiguity or disagreement on this matter by selecting the higher standard of care.
Professor Ian Ayres has written insightfully about the efficiency-generating qualities that non-majoritarian default rules can have in some cases.
66 Particularly relevant here is his insight into situations in which parties have asymmetrical information about legal rights. In such cases, he argues that setting the default rule "against the more knowledgeable party" 67 may lead to more fully informed bargaining, since the more knowledgeable party, in attempting to bargain his way out of the position he dislikes, will be encouraged to share information with the informationallydisadvantaged party. This line of argument supports a higher standard of care when there is uncertainty about the nature of an efficient duty of care rule. In my own experience as a transactional lawyer for unincorporated entities, I found in nearly all cases asymmetry of information between managers and investors 
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as to the nature of fiduciary duties. 68 Investors often have little or no idea about the statutory standard of care that applies to managers. Managers, on the other hand, are almost invariably in control of the critical entity documents, the operating agreement in the case of LLCs, and have access to and a relationship with the attorney drafting those documents. In short, managers or controlling members and their agent (the attorney they select to generate the initial entity documents) may in most cases have superior information over investors in regard to the statutory duty of care applicable to the entity's managers.
In such cases, if lax, gross negligence is the statutory standard for LLCs, underinformed investors may invest and price their investment mistakenly believing that managers are obliged to act reasonably in regard to investors' best interests. Managers may have an economic interest in this inefficient outcome, since, by exploiting the asymmetry of information, they may be able, for example, to extract a higher level of compensation, reflecting a negligence standard of care, while actually being held to a more lax, gross negligence standard.
Bargaining between the parties in such cases is improved, and efficient and fair outcomes are promoted, by adopting negligence as the statutory standard of care for LLCs. Managers or controlling members who want a more lax standard of care can achieve that only by getting the consent of the members of the LLC, which at least to some extent diminishes the informational asymmetry gap. Requiring the consent of investors promotes for them more readily available and cheaper access to information regarding the applicable duty of care.
69
In summary, states should reject RULLCA's "subject to the business judgment rule" formula. Overlaying the business judgment rule on a negligence standard of care creates an inefficient duty of care provision in RULLCA. It will also confuse both LLC parties and courts, and there is the risk that courts interpreting the "subject to the business judgment rule" language may adopt some or all of the misdirected, confusing and inefficient analyses and interpretations that infect Delaware corporate law.
A better approach for states considering RULLCA, therefore, is to modify RULLCA's standard of care and adopt a clearly articulated negligence standard of care as the default rule, applicable alike to monitoring and discrete actions by managers or controlling members. Not only is a clear negligence standard more efficient and less likely to generate pernicious confusion, but also such an approach will tend to enhance the information available to the parties at bargaining. 68. Empirical work by Professor Sandra K. Miller generally supports this conclusion. See Miller, supra note 19, at 585-86. Her work, she believes, "casts doubt on" the assumption that "operating agreements will be highly negotiated .. " Id.
69. Under RULLCA, parties wishing to opt out of the default standard of care must include the remade standard of care in the operating agreement. The remade duty of care cannot be "manifestly unreasonable" or "authorize intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law." RULLCA § I I0(d)(3) (Supp. 2007) .
I make no strong claims regarding the extent to which provisions in the operating agreement are fully understood by investors. My view is that the extent to which investors fully understand terms of the operating agreement vary and that complex, tedious, and lengthy operating agreements have a negative impact on the informational value of the operating agreement. Nonetheless, including terms in the operating agreement always enhances information, compared to a situation where terms are not in the operating agreement. In that regard, my suggestion, which is made later in this article, is that fiduciary duty provisions in the operating agreement should be referenced and described in prominent, bold type on the outside front cover of the operating agreement. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
RULLCA S "NEW" FIDUCIARY STANDARDS
Opting Out of RULLCA 's Standard of Care
RULLCA allows parties to opt out of or reconstitute the statutorily imposed standard of care, subject to only three substantive limitations. 70 First, the duty of care may not be entirely eliminated.
7 Second, the standard of care reconstituted by the parties may not be "manifestly unreasonable."
72 Finally, the reconstituted standard of care may not "authorize intentional misconduct or knowing violation of [the] law."" RULLCA imposes no particular procedural prerequisites to opting out of or reconstituting the default standard of care, except for a requirement that the reconstituted duty of care standard be contained in the operating agreement.
74
Opt-out provisions generally can promote efficiency by allowing parties to refashion statutory default rules in situations in which their preferences differ from the terms of the statute. 75 For opt-out provisions to promote maximum efficiency, however, the parties to the opt-out agreement must be fully informed. If a party agrees to opt out of rights that she does not understand or into rights that she does not understand, there is no way to determine whether the transaction enhanced allocative efficiency. One may restate this matter in fairness terms, since a lack of full information on a party's part undermines consent and thus, at least arguably, unfairly subjects a party to the terms of an arrangement to which the party did not consent.
RULLCA's opt-out provisions fail fully to promote efficiency and fairness primarily because the provisions do not address the lack of full information on the part of the parties exercising the opt-out right. As noted earlier, 76 because the LLC's manager or controlling member in most cases controls the entity documents and has the most direct contact with the lawyer drafting the entity documents, 77 the manager or controlling member typically enjoys information superiority over the LLC's investors. The manager or controlling member may also have a strong pecuniary interest in exploiting this information asymmetry. As concerns the duty of care, the LLC manager See infra Appendix B. The nature of the procedural requirements for opting out is important in regard to efficient outcomes. To the extent that procedural requirements drive up costs, opting out of a default provision into a reconstituted provision may become prohibitively expensive, causing the parties to refrain from opting out of what for them is an inefficient default rule. For example, if the value created by opting out is ten but the cost of opting out is twelve, the parties will not exercise the right to opt out.
75. This is the same point, restated slightly, made earlier in Part H of this article. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 77. 1 base this factual assumption on my own experience as a transactional lawyer and on conversations and experiences of other lawyers. In my own case, a substantial part of my practice involved non-corporate entities, and I was always engaged to draft the entity documents by the person who would provide the principal management services to the entity. It was clear that my compensation would be controlled by that manager. It was also clear that future business from the client depended upon my satisfying the preferences of the manager of the entity.
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may be able to generate pecuniary gain for himself through an inefficient bargain in which he gets paid as if he is operating under a high standard of care while actually being subject to a low standard of care.
Two adjustments in RULLCA's opt-out provision would ameliorate the pernicious effects of this asymmetry of information and thus promote efficient and fair outcomes. First, the RULLCA provision requiring opt-out terms to be contained in the operating agreement should be supplemented by a rule requiring a prominent, concise statement in plain English on the outside front cover page of the operating agreement describing and explaining the essential terms of the opt-out and the reformulated standard of care. The statement should clearly cross-reference the complete opt-out provision, if it appears elsewhere in the document.
78
RULLCA's provision requiring that the opt-out be contained in the operating agreement is sound, because it increases, at least somewhat, the likelihood of full information on the part of investors about the terms of the opt-out. Even with this provision, however, full information on the part of investors is problematic. For example, if the opt-out provision is buried on page twenty-two of a complex and tedious thirty page operating agreement, it seems unlikely that most investors would come to understand the terms of the provision. While perfection in regard to full information is never possible, a prominent legend describing the opt-out and placed prominently on the outside front cover page of the operating agreement would seem in a cost-benefit analysis to make a lot of sense. The cost of including such a statement would be minimal, and it may in a significant number of cases enhance the understanding of investors regarding the quality of management they are actually purchasing.
79
The second adjustment that would improve RULLCA's opt-out provision is to raise the mandatory floor for the duty of care. RULLCA permits parties to a LLC to opt out of the statutory standard of care and adopt any standard of care short of allowing managers to engage in "intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law." To enable the parties to adopt such an exceeding low standard of care promotes, on balance, inefficient and unfair outcomes. The mandatory floor for duty of care for 78. This can be modeled on the Securities and Exchange Commission practice, which has for decades required prospectuses to describe or cross-reference on the outside front cover page of the document important investment information. For example, Item 501 of Regulation SK, 17 C.F.R. § 229.501 (2008), which is incorporated by reference into Registration Form S-3, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 715 1, requires the issuer to state on the "outside front cover page of the prospectus ... 79. My suggestion would be to amend RULLCA section 110(d) to add the following language: "Any reduction in the statutory standard of care must be prominently, concisely and clearly explained and disclosed on the first page of the operating agreement." The proposal does not provide specific language necessary to meet the "prominently, concisely and clearly" criteria. This should be left to the parties, along with the residual risk that the default standard will be applicable, if they fail to meet the three criteria designed to promote full information. While this will increase transaction costs somewhat, principally due to the residual risk if the promoting party gets it wrong, fiduciaries, who likely will be controlling the construction of the documents, including the operating agreement, will have a strong self interest in constructing a disclosure that meets the criteria and thus promotes full disclosure.
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Normally, one thinks of readily accessible, unlimited opt-out provisions as enhancing efficiency, because such provisions enable parties to pursue their own preferences when those preferences differ from the majoritarian preferences that, hopefully, at least, are normally reflected in efficient default standards. Efficiencies generated by an opt-out may depend, however, on fully informed parties. If, because of a lack of full information, parties opt out of more efficient arrangements into less efficient arrangements, opt-out provisions actually generate inefficiency." 0 Such inefficient opt-outs seem likely under RULLCA's provisions that set the mandatory floor at the very lax "intentional misconduct" standard. As described above in this section, LLC managers usually enjoy a material informational advantage over investors. Provisions in an operating agreement reconstituting the default standard of care into an extremely lax standard of care, especially when such provisions are buried in long and complex operating agreements, are unlikely to be understood by many investors. While my view, described above, is that a prominent statement on the outside front cover page of the operating agreement would provide some relief for under-informed LLC investors, it will not cause all investors to be fully informed in all transactions. The likelihood is that, even with the statement, managers will continue to be able to exploit their informational superiority by constructing inefficient transactions regarding their reconstituted duty of care. A higher mandatory floor, therefore, will enhance efficiency and fairness by limiting this conduct.
The benefits of eliminating these inefficient and unfair transactions, however, must be compared to the economic costs associated with raising the mandatory floor of the duty of care. The economic costs are understood best as the inability of fullyinformed parties to pursue an arrangement that suits their preferences. Under a "gross negligence" floor, parties that prefer an "intentional misconduct" standard of care are forced to accept a gross negligence standard of care. The costs here are the inefficiency and unfairness of forcing the parties to accept an arrangement that they do not prefer.
Such costs from imposing the higher mandatory floor of gross negligence, however, seem to be minimal. The reason is that it is quite unlikely that in many cases fully-informed parties would ever agree on a standard of care below gross negligence. From the investors' side of the transaction, it seems to me highly unlikely that fully- L. 55 (1997) . Although clearly favoring LLC fiduciary rules that permit generous opting out, Professor Booth defends the limitations the ULLCA imposes on the complete opting out of fiduciary duties. He concludes that permitting parties an unlimited right to opt out of the ULLCA's fiduciary standards "is too easy." Id. at 64. "A statute that allows for total waiver would likely undercut serious bargaining between the parties . . . [and] would allow the more informed party simply to insist on a total waiver without specifying the nature of the conflict expected." Id. at61.
See also Loewenstein, supra note 28. Loewenstein explained, "[T]he relevant operating or partnership agreement may be very long and complex. Terms that relate to fiduciary duties may not be collected in one section; instead, terms ... may appear in various sections dealing with management, distributions, repurchase of units, etc." Id. at 28. Later he noted that "the investor may not, in fact, be fully informed or sufficiently sophisticated .... " Id. at 28-29.
